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Abstract
Information superiority is a condition that many businesses attempt to attain without truly understanding what it
is, or how to get there. This paper presents an overview to help businesspeople recognize the road to information
superiority, and some of the essential strategies to implement along the way. Information operations is a concept
described to enable information superiority, when used with a network form of organization (as opposed to
simply being networked).  This paper describes information operations across their fundamental structure of
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); and suggests a separation between industrial espionage
and legitimate business information gathering. A model for establishing information superiority is presented,
outlining the importance of ‘cradle-to-grave’  implementation throughout the business lifecycle.   This brings
together key doctrinal points from the information security, information operations and information warfare
fields.  Supplementary  material  is  drawn from sociology,  risk  analysis,  and business management  theory  to
complete the applicability of the text to business readers.
Keywords
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INTRODUCTION
Information warfare (IW) and its related activities of information operations (IO) and intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance (ISR) are not just restricted to the military arena. As the power and usability of information
technology has progressively permeated society it has provided private citizens, commercial entities, and other
political or ad-hoc organizations with a new platform for operations, influence, and attack (Armistead, 2004).
While much of the published IW, IO, and ISR material focuses on military models and modes of conflict, there is
much that  is  relevant  to  commercial  practitioners.  Non-military  readers  may  however  find  it  frustrating  to
translate and adapt this material to the business world, and there is further work to be done in redefining the topic
so  that  these  techniques  might  contribute  towards  achieving  information  superiority  (IS)  in  commercial
marketplaces.
This paper will focus on describing a new breed of business organization; one that recognizes the importance of
information superiority, and uses ISR empowered information operations in a networked environment to obtain
it. It will describe these issues using a perspective and language appropriate to the modern business environment.
Information superiority in the business context
While some commercial operators may feel that they are indeed at war in certain markets, for many others there
is a familiarity with their business activities that makes them appear a long way from obvious adversarialism. Yet
many every-day business activities are acts designed to attain information superiority in the marketplace, such as:
Purchasing an enhanced listing in a business directory
Conducting a customer satisfaction survey 
Upgrading office-based computer systems 
These activities all exist within a series of converging spheres that define the field of information superiority, as
shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Components of Information Superiority
(Armistead, 2004) 
It is easy to recognize and apply this model to virtually any business in any competitive arena, with examples












Enumerating competitors pricing or product offerings
The key to information superiority for any business is to achieve and maintain their competitive advantage as
close to the absolute centre of this model as possible, where the benefits of proximity and interaction between
each sphere of operation can be exploited.  Yet in order to consolidate ones own position at the centre of the
model it is necessary to dislodge others; in fact there is room for only one organization at the true centre of such a
model, and all others must suffer some degree of displacement. 
This  competitive  element  underlies  the  basic  premise  and  definition  of  information  superiority,  as  one
organization can only claim such superiority over another  as  a  relative measure (Waltz,  1998).  Information
superiority can therefore be defined as:
The degree of dominance that allows… the ability to collect, control, exploit, and defend
information without effective opposition
(U.S.A.F 1998)
In the process of obtaining such an advantage one actor must exploit its information in a way that others cannot,
and may indeed actively seek to prevent others from understanding, gathering, accessing, or acting on their own
information resources (Schwartau, 1996). Figure 2 demonstrates a scenario where one actor achieves information






















Figure 2: Relative Information Superiority positioning by actors
Shaping the Business Battlespace
As marketplaces become increasingly competitive and actors more aggressive in their quest  for  information
superiority, then the framework within which that marketplace operates will lose the idealised symmetry shown
in  Figure  1.  The  introduction  of  new  technologies  and  business  practices  may  lead  to  integrations  and
transformations between various aspects of operation. A company that fails to maintain an effective presence in
these reconfigured arenas will find itself increasingly subject to the strategic planning of the dominant actor, who
therefore operates from a position of information superiority over them. 
Figure 3 illustrates how the integration of information systems and relevant information can create such an
asymmetrical marketplace. This scenario would result from an industry in which so much data is generated that
an information system becomes essential for the processing of it. Information relevancy and information systems
are therefore dependent upon each other and merge into a powerful super-domain that redefines the marketplace.
The dominance of any one actor in this newly evolved domain can have adverse effects on other actors as they
endeavour to implement their information operations, for example by:
Controlling access to the relevant information through commissioning it and keeping the results private
Acquiring control of either the information systems or information producers, such as by merging with or
acquiring a software development or market research company.
Undertaking action within the information operations field that dissuades or prevents other actors from
attacking the dominant actors position; for example by publicising a (usually non-technical) capability
























Figure 3: Shaping the marketplace to ensure Information Superiority
The scenario presented in Figure 3 tends to evolve within markets as a result of deliberate action, as opposed to
accidental  or  fortuitous  circumstance (Webster,  1995).  In  this  figure  actor  ‘a’  has  forced a market  lead  by
merging its incoming stream of highly relevant information to a powerful information system. This has given it a
significantly greater advantage than simply relying on dominance across the previously existing three separate
domains, as its competitors cannot obtain the equivalent relevance of information in their systems (as ‘a’ has
taken steps to prevent this by conducting private research). This has magnified the value and effectiveness of
both the information and the system it is stored and processed in. 
It is due to such deliberate action by one or more actors that new technologies gain prominence, and while the
introduction of such a strategy may be time consuming, expensive, and difficult, if done well it can contribute to
a position that other actors might find difficult to challenge for some time to come (Armistead, 2004). What
should also be accepted into the corporate strategy is that marketplaces are constantly in this state of flux, and no
single strategy is  going to  suit  market  conditions all  of  the time.  The more actors there are in a  particular
marketplace the rougher the swell is likely to be from competing technologies, skills shortages, legislation, and
the  offensive/defensive  information operations  of  others.  In  this  environment  the actor  seeking  information
superiority must be prepared to change quickly (and often) the way in which they do business, and may even
need to undertake all-out information warfare to protect their interests.
In military terms such posturing would be known as ‘intelligence preparation of the battlespace’ (IPB), and as the
name implies there are intelligence operations as precursors that must take place to aid the success of subsequent
action (FAS, accessed 7/4/2005, Armistead, 2004 and Waltz, 1998).  Just as military planners will not undertake
wartime action until sufficient information regarding the battlefield is obtained (and communications are in place
to attack it with improved chances of success), neither should a commercial actor attempt to enter or control a
market until they are fully aware of the potential difficulties and likelihood of conflict.
In the business world this process should be viewed as marketplace awareness and influence (MAI). MAI is
composed of legitimate business activities that include:
Surveillance (of market competitors, laws, clients,  or political influences) 
Planning (strategic product or service direction, risk analysis, and internal audit)
Establishing communications systems
Establishing warning systems (to improve detection & reaction responses)
Provisional information operations to begin proactively gathering relevant data to map the market,
undertake marketing, and develop competitive strategies.
Accepting Information Operations as an Organizational Norm
The  previous  examples  describe  what  happens  quite  naturally  in  Western,  capitalist  economies  –  where
competition and ‘winning’ is a key, often subconscious process which all actors engage in to better their position
in the marketplace.   Yet,  as  we frequently witness,  this process produces numerous losers -  victims of the
information superiority and effective information operations of others.
However, once an organization recognizes through MAI the wider battleground within which it operates, then it
is better placed to survive and prosper.   The application of information superiority principles needs to be applied
to  all of  its  on-going activities,  as information superiority  is  not achieved by any  one department,  person,
product, or action. Neither is it a strategy that should be attempted only in times of increased competition or
financial difficulties. Figure 4 describes a series of parallel and linear strategic processes, which would contribute
towards information superiority were they to be applied from the inception of a business (or business process)
and throughout the various stages in its lifecycle.
Figure 4: Business processes enabling information superiority (Author, 2005)
 In order to implement such a model an organization must:
Adopt a networked structure  
Operate with speed, utilizing effective offensive/defensive tactics based on observation, orientation,
decision, and action (OODA) loops (Waltz, 1998) 
Implement efficient information collection, management, and dissemination systems
Undertake pro-active intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations (ISR), and integrate these
into all other information operations
These tactics should help achieve the twin goals of  dominant marketplace awareness (DMA) and dominant
marketplace knowledge (DMK). DMA is assisted by gathering data inputs from automated and human sensors in
and around the marketplace,  and the understanding,  analysis,  and application of  these contributes  to  DMK
(Waltz, 1998).
Once DMA and DMK have been attained it  is  possible for  a  business  to  act  with confidence,  maintaining
knowledge of the likely response from competitors and the ability of  those competitors to survive a hostile
engagement. In both DMA and DMK the concepts of OODA loops should be applied, and efforts made to
interrupt the OODA loops of other actors to gain information superiority over them. If just one aspect of OODA
can be manipulated or removed from an opponent then their loop will crash or be corrupted, as it is a feature of
OODA that  if  one  component  is  removed  then  the  loop  must  return  to  the  initial  ‘observe’  status  and all
subsequent actions  re-tried.  Business  processes  are disrupted if  they are  unable to  effectively complete any
OODA loops, particularly if the first two components (observe and orient) are targeted (Vacca, 2002). In such a
case the informationally superior organization gains a greater prize: an attainment of the ‘knowledge edge’ and
decision making superiority (Armistead, 2004).
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
ISR are an important trio of activities for any business to undertake. ISR must be both external and internal to the
organization in order to detect emerging threats and trends that can undermine not just competitiveness, but the
core ability to operate and function at all. While these terms originate from the military, their translation into the
commercial world has not been particularly encouraging. Often referred to as ‘industrial espionage’, ISR in the
business arena retains an air of illegality and unfairness.
This is an attitude that must change within any organization hoping to achieve and maintain a fully-rounded
position of information superiority. With this in mind it is far better to import terminology from the IT sector,
and ISR for commercial organizations should be seen as simply another part  of ‘business intelligence’ (BI)
(Simovits  & Forsberg,  1997).  Industrial  espionage will  still  retain  a  place in  the taxonomy of  information
operations, but it should be put in its rightful position as an extreme tool for information warfare (a separate
activity from normal information operations (Armistead, 2004)). 
Industrial espionage is an activity used to great effect by foreign actors to acquire technology they could never
develop independently, and it remains of particular danger to internationally operating corporations (Schwartau,
1996). Yet however useful industrial espionage may be as an IS/IW weapon, its use must be carefully considered
due to the grave consequences of discovery, which may disastrously harm the business employing it.   
Some examples of what constitutes industrial espionage are detailed in Table 1. Also included are BI gathering
activities which should be considered legitimate, legal, and useful.
Industrial Espionage Business Intelligence gathering/intelligence operations
Stealing documents from a competitors premises Gathering from open source intelligence  – news, websites
(‘Google hacking’), reports, patents
Hacking into computer systems and
viewing/changing/removing data
Discussions with former employees of competitors
Blackmail/extortion Hiring a 3rd party private investigator to evaluate competitors
premises, business, or personnel
Bomb threats/triggering fire alarms or smoke detectors Placing a mole in competitors organization to observe working
practices
Vandalism or destruction of premises or employee
cars/possessions
Dumpster diving (but avoiding trespass)
Committing fraud, other crime, or ordering goods in the
name of the competitor
Mapping a competitors business links – suppliers, partners,
divisions, etc
Creating and sending viruses or Trojans into the
competitors information system
Listening for employee conversations in public locations –
food hall, café, smokers area outside building
Making a claim to authorities of a business transgression or crime being committed by competitor (this COULD be illegal
depending on nature of accusation and how you present ‘evidence’)
Table 1: Industrial Espionage versus Business Intelligence activities (Robinson, 2003 and Simovits & Forsberg,
1997, and Winkler, accessed 2005).
As many businesses already possess BI software, designed to move data between departments and help interpret
meaning, this should be used to provide a framework to enable the organization to incorporate ISR information
and empower the all-important networked form of operation. But BI systems are only as good as the quality and
diversity of information input to them, so for a BI system to contribute towards information superiority it should
extend its appetite for data (using the legal techniques from Table 1) into competing organizations, consumer
lifestyle habits,  and legislative structures.  The result  for  the host  organization will  be an ability  to  see  the
structures that exist behind the raw information, and the phenomena that influences them (Webster, 1995). With
this  kind  of  system pervading  the  nodes  of  an  organization  (flowing  freely  across  departments  in  a  non-
hierarchical manner), information superiority relative to other actors in the same marketplace is enabled.
Information Value
All information in a  business has value, which can range from ‘none’ to ‘essential’.  As modern companies
generate  and  process  ever-growing  volumes  of  data,  it  becomes  vital  that  essential  information  is  readily
identified and utilized, and that value-less information is disposed of or stored so as not to cause a distraction.
This  concept of  value is  critical  to attaining information superiority,  as there has  to  exist  a  framework for
prioritizing which information to either attack or defend, and this will vary depending on the marketplace and
actors involved (Rues, 2003).
The value of information is increased, and its dissemination enhanced, by the use of business networks. The
greater the number of nodes that can access and process information at any one time, the more new information
can be generated to describe the original data, provide new interpretations, or give birth to new analysis. The
simple formula which describes this phenomenon is called Metcalf’s Law, and is articulated as:
N*(N-1)
Where N is the total number of nodes in a network, and the result is a value metric based on the total amount of
connectivity in that network.
While this formula holds true if we assume that all information has the same initial value and that all nodes
process it in the same way to produce regular and consistent outputs, the results can be anomalous if this is not
the case (Alberts et al, 2000). If we wish to accurately weight the value of information then a user must arrive at
a shortlist of values that are important to them, and use the network to enhance these values above others. The
establishment of such value systems will vary across marketplaces, and should be revisited regularly to establish
the impact of competitive practices, intelligence operations, and network upgrades.
Figure  5  demonstrates  the  application  of  a  user-generated  value  system,  to  evaluate  the  effectiveness  of
traditional retail grocery shopping against a 24x7 on-line ordering and home delivery alternative. The networked
form of retailing can be identified as more effective across the spectrum of important measures for this sector.
Figure 5: Grocery shopping comparison - value matrix of network-enabled business model versus traditional
model
Through  the  application  of  such  analysis  further  steps  are  taken  towards  information  superiority  over
contemporaries. If one actor is able to hamper the effectiveness of just one aspect of value in a competitors
business  (and those in similar  markets will  have some common values),  then a business advantage will  be
realized (Hawker, 2000).
Networking the Organization
As demonstrated, the networked form of organization is the most successful form. Hierarchies are difficult to
maintain by comparison, especially in light of the internationalization of business markets, the rise of contracting
services, and the speed at which decisions must be made – it simply takes too long for information to move up to
decision makers and for actionable direction to flow down. Network forms are best able to exploit real-time
communications and physically dispersed business units, and businesses that maintain traditional hierarchies are
liable to find their market position undermined by more agile networked adversaries (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 1997).
When  considering  networking  an  organization  it  is  important  to  realize  that  the  network  must  be  applied
internally to the organization – it is not enough to make an essentially hierarchical organization part of someone
else’s network without reflecting that change within. Once the internal change has been made then extra value
may be added by interfacing to other networks as the operational need arises.
CONCLUSION
It  is  clear that information superiority for any organization is  not easy, and is  not something which can be
attained and then considered owned.  In  markets  where monolithic  organizations have  previously prospered,








On-line ordering with 24x7 home delivery
relaxing political barriers. Such organizations may have headquarters in one country, manufacturing in another,
raw materials from several more, and a target market in any combination of all of them. 
Businesses must recognise such threats early on and be willing and creative in their actions to counter them.
Information superiority is  a  status which will enable this to happen, and in the process prevent one of two
disastrous events from occurring: either all-out information warfare (which may cause damage to the marketplace
and destroy the unprepared), or the knockout sucker-punch which the business just did not see coming and which
undermines their information position. The time for businesses to begin their efforts toward attaining information
superiority is now, and the place is here.
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